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THAYER VERSUS MARSHALL
Gary Lawson*
Professor Nagel's intriguing paper1 suggests that James Bradley
Thayer's clear error rule of constitutional adjudication 2 is not an effective
vehicle for controlling, and indeed may even exacerbate, the tendency
toward invective that often characterizes modem court decisions and
legal arguments. Professor Nagel is too charitable. To the extent that
Thayer's article has had an influence on either the style or substance of
modem constitutional law, that influence has been even more pernicious
than Professor Nagel lets on. The source of that problem, however, is
less the clear error rule itself than the premises that generate and, in
Thayer's view, justify the rule.
The case against Thayerism begins with an obvious but fundamental
observation: As Professor Nagel notes in passing,3 the kind of demonizing language and casual character assassination that he rightly regrets in
legal discussions is routine in contemporary political discussions. And
thus has it always been. Anyone who believes in a golden age of American political discourse should read the debates in Congress on the Alien
and Sedition Acts-not to mention the text of the Sedition Act itself. It
is no doubt regrettable that political debate takes, and has always taken,
this unsavory form, but it is not especially surprising. Politics deals with
values. Although some of us believe that propositions of value can be
and ought to be subject to rational validation, there is unfortunately no
consensus in our political culture about how to resolve normative questions in a substantively rational fashion. In the absence of such consensus, rational argument about values is unlikely to be fruitful, as there is
no common standard by which arguments can be evaluated. And when
argument is bound to fail, rhetoric, including invective, is a natural
substitute.
But that is politics. Law, we might insist, is a different discipline, in
which the cheap rhetorical tools that often work on a rationally unin* Associate Professor, Northwestern University School of Law. I am grateful to Akhil Reed
Amar for his valuable comments.
I Robert F. Nagel, Name-Calling and the ClearError Rule, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 193 (1993).
2 The rule prescribes that a court may disregard a legislative (or, presumably, an executive) act
only "when those who have the right to make laws have not merely made a mistake, but have made a
very clear one,--so clear that it is not open to rational question." James B. Thayer, The Origin and
Scope of the American Doctrine of ConstitutionalLaw, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 144 (1893).
3 Nagel, supra note 1, at 196.
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formed electorate ought not to be given credence. We are entitled, a
"Nagelian" might argue, to expect different, and better, from our judges
and advocates than from our legislators and lobbyists. And indeed we
are entitled to expect better-but only if we reject Thayer's rationale for
the clear error rule.
As Thayer himself noted, although the clear error rule has a long
and distinguished pedigree, it emphatically does not trace its origin to
Marbury v. Madison4 in either history or principle. Because this conference is fundamentally concerned with judicial review, it may be helpful
to recall Marbury's straightforwardly syllogistic argument for that practice: (1) the duty of courts is to decide cases in accordance with law; (2)
the Constitution is supreme law, hierarchically superior to all other potential sources of law, including statutes; therefore, (3) it is the duty of
courts to decide cases in accordance with the Constitution in hierarchical
preference to all other potential sources of law, including statutes. This
argument does not categorically preclude a clear error rule or some other
form of deference to legislative or executive judgments, but it certainly
does not generate or encourage any such rule. Under the Marbury analysis, one would be no more inclined to give deference to a legislative interpretation of the Constitution than to give deference to an agent's
construction of a contract of agency.
Accordingly, Thayer did not try to derive the clear error rule from
Marbury. To the contrary, he affirmatively ridiculed Marbury's argument for judicial review and insisted that the clear error rule "corrected" 5 (to use Thayer's pointed term) what would otherwise have been
the inappropriate operation of Marbury's principles.
What, according to Thayer, is wrong with Marbury? Chief Justice
Marshall's argument, he wrote, "took no notice of the remarkable peculiarities of the situation; it went forward as smoothly as if the constitution
were a private letter of attorney, and the court's duty under it were precisely like any of its most ordinary operations."' 6 In other words, Marbury presupposes a simple conception of constitutional adjudication in
which one places a statute alongside the Constitution and then decides
whether the two texts are consistent, using precisely the same tools of
analysis that one would employ in more mundane legal tasks. This way
of framing the inquiry, said Thayer in the central passage of his article,
easily results in the wrong kind of disregard of legislative considerations;
not merely in refusing to let them directly operate as grounds of judgment,
but in refusing to consider them at all. Instead of taking them into account
and allowing for them as furnishing possible grounds of legislative action,
there takes place a pedantic and academic treatment of the texts of the
constitution and the laws. And so we miss that combination of a lawyer's
4 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
5 Thayer, supra note 2, at 140.
6 Id. at 139.
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rigor with a statesman's breadth of view which should
be found in dealing
7
with this class of questions in constitutional law.
By contrast, says Thayer, the clear error rule
recognizes that, having regard to the great, complex, ever-unfolding exigencies of government, much which will seem unconstitutional to one man, or
body of men, may reasonably not seem so to another; that the constitution
often admits of different interpretations; that there is often a range of choice
and judgment; that in such cases the constitution does not impose upon the
legislature any one specific opinion, but leaves open 8this range of choice;
and that whatever choice is rational is constitutional.
Put less delicately, in Thayer's view, many questions of constitutional
interpretation are not strictly legal questions, but are instead questions of
political morality, to which conventional forms and methods of legal reasoning are not well suited. In Thayer's constitutional world, the judge
needs both the "rigor" of the lawyer's craft and the "breadth" of the
statesman's perspective. 9
It is not hard to see how this principle could lead to the degradation
of discourse in legal argument. If constitutional questions are really
about politics rather than law, no one should be surprised if constitutional discourse takes on the familiar and unpleasant character of political discourse. If constitutional interpretation is really about values (or
"substance," as it is sometimes called) rather than technical legalisms
amenable to the lawyer's lowly craft, there is no more reason to expect
lawyers and judges to solve the problems of the ages in a civil and rational fashion than to expect the rest of the political community to do so.
So if we are not surprised that political candidates carelessly hurl around
charges like "racism," we should not be surprised when "statesmanlike"
judges behave the same way-in other words, when they behave like our
statesmen. Nor can we even bemoan their behavior unless we can all
agree on the appropriate methodology for rationally answering substantive questions of value. It is fruitless to criticize judges and lawyers for
making bad moral and political arguments unless we can tell them how
to make and recognize good ones.
There is, of course, more wrong with Thayer's argument than its
potential to degrade discourse. Thayer's analysis not only undercuts the
civility of our legal discourse, it fundamentally undercuts the basic rationale for judicial review. If the Constitution is not law in the traditional sense, courts should not merely give deference to legislative
judgments; they should abandon the enterprise of judicial review altogether-at least until one can find (as Thayer did not) a rationale for
judicial review that does not depend on the Constitution's status as
7 Id. at 138.

s Id. at 144.
9 For an illuminating discussion of (for lack of a better phrase) the perils ofjudicial statesmanship, see James E. Bond, The Perils ofJudicialStatesmanship,7 OKLA. CiTY U. L. REV. 399 (1982).

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

supreme law. In other words, unless a relatively pedantic, naive theory
of constitutional adjudication is really correct, a persuasive case for any
kind of judicial review is very difficult to sustain.
None of this means that Thayer has not made a valuable contribution to the legal enterprise. Quite the contrary: he made one contribution whose importance has yet to be adequately appreciated. As I have
argued at length elsewhere, 10 any theory of legal interpretation must
specify both what sorts of considerations count for or against the truth of
any legal proposition and how much of that evidence must be amassed
before a legal proposition can be deemed true. Put another way, in order
to justify a proposition, we need both rules of admissibility (what
counts?) and standards of proof (how much evidence do we need?).
Thayer, unlike most scholars, at least addressed the latter consideration
by alleging that propositions asserting the unconstitutionality of federal
legislation should be deemed true only when they are established beyond
a reasonable doubt. There are, of course, other possible standards of
proof that one could apply to such propositions: one might accept them
as true when they are supported by clear and convincing evidence or a
preponderance of the evidence, or even simply because they are relatively
better than any alternative propositions. But some standard of proof
must be chosen, and Thayer helps bring that fact to our consciousness.
By analogy to Michael Perry's distinction between originalism and
minimalism1" (and more generally between the admissibility rules of an
interpretative theory and the theory's method for handling either interpretative or normative uncertainty), the choice of a standard of proof for
legal propositions is not, as a general matter, logically entailed by one's
choice of an interpretative theory. One can be an originalist, for example, and without contradiction adopt any of the standards of proof set
forth above. But the choice of a standard of proof is affected to some
degree by one's normative justification for judicial review. If one believes
in the Marbury rationale for judicial review, it is unlikely that one would
adopt a "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard for propositions of unconstitutionality-no more than one would adopt such a standard for ordinary contract interpretation. Nor would one likely adopt any standard
of proof that involves deference to Congress, the President, or the states.
If the Constitution is a legal document with an ascertainable meaning,
that meaning is, in principle, equally available to all persons. As Judge
Frank Easterbrook once paraphrased John Marshall in a slightly different context, Marbury's rule of interpretation is, "Every man for himself," 12 which leaves no room for Thayer-style deference to political
actors. Moreover, if the purpose of constitutionalism (and hence of judi10 See Gary Lawson, Proving the Law, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 859 (1992).
11 See Michael J. Perry, The Constitution, the Courts, and the Question of Minimalism, 88 Nw.
U. L. REV. 84 (1993).
12 Frank H. Easterbrook, PresidentialReview, 40 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 905, 919 (1989-90).
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cial review) is to check governmental power, Thayerian minimalism is
doubly problematic. Consider a death row inmate who argues that his
constitutional rights were violated either before or during his trial. As a
normative matter, should that inmate really have to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the government behaved unconstitutionally (perhaps
by passing the statute under which he was convicted), even though the
government bears a heavy beyond-a-reasonable-doubt burden to show
that the accused in fact committed the acts in question? Perhaps so, but
the claim is hardly obvious.
Thayer's essay reminds us that the central question of constitutional
theory is whether constitutional interpretation is essentially like interpretation of, as Thayer put it, a "private letter of attorney," or whether it is
something larger, grander, and more value-laden-in other words, more
political. To paraphrase Judge Easterbrook,13 Marbury says the former,
and Marbury is right.

13 Id. at 924.

